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High voltage equipment is mostly designed according to technically prescriptive standards 
requirements based on electrical engineering safety principles. However a more risk-based approach 
to standards and regulation may be advisable to enable designer and user to take an active role in 
establishing that their installation is inherently safe. The use of Gas Insulated Switchgear (GIS) for 
instance is enabling the new substation to be housed indoors and condensed into around one quarter 
of the space. The manufacturers argue that design improvements in GIS make it virtually “maintenance 
free”, comply with all the relevant standards. However some of these improvements have implications 
for the operators that need to be taken into account. Commissioning, operational checks and 
inspections and the occasional maintenance interventions are activities during which the technicians 
need to interface with the equipment, the issues regarding the interfaces provided have been analysed 
to identify their relevance in the overall risk assessment of the equipment. The paper reports about a 
study aimed at verifying through a risk analysis the impacts that the issues related to deficit in 
ergonomic design may present for the overall availability and safety of the plant. Those issues are not 
tackled in the technical standards and/or designers current practice. 
1. Background of the study 
Several research projects and programs on system safety engineering and Quantitative Risk Analysis 
in the last 40 years offered very strong evidence of the crucial role that human and organizational 
factors (HOFs) play in major accidents. According to this increasing concern toward the relevance of 
HOFs in limiting safety performance considerable research effort has been spent worldwide in the last 
couple of decades. This resulted in quite a rich literature covering areas from theoretical bases, to 
accident investigation methods and application to major disasters, to very sophisticated modelling 
approaches and techniques of HOFs in Quantitative Risk Analysis and many standards trying to 
incorporate more physical aspects of Human factors like Ergonomics design. Nevertheless, many of 
the models and applications described in scientific literature demonstrate very limited impact on the 
technical standards applied for evaluation of safety critical equipment and procedures. The standards 
used for providing requirements of High voltage equipment for instance do not take into proper account 
aspects related to the human limited but by no means negligible interaction with the equipment. High 
voltage equipment is mostly designed according to technically prescriptive standards requirements 
based on electrical engineering safety principles (CEI IEC 62271-202, 2006). However a more risk-
based approach to standards and regulation may be advisable to enable designer and user to take an 
active role in establishing that their installation is inherently safe. The use of Gas Insulated Switchgear 
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(GIS) for instance is enabling the new substation to be housed indoors and condensed into around one 
quarter of the space. The manufacturers argue that design improvements in GIS make it virtually 
“maintenance free”. However some of these improvements have implications for the operators that 
need to be taken into account. A GIS more compact in fact often means having awkward stations for 
the technicians during commissioning and maintenance actions that are still required to be performed. 
Commissioning, operational checks and inspections and the occasional maintenance interventions are 
activities during which the technicians need to interface with the equipment, the issues regarding the 
interfaces provided have been analysed to identify their relevance in the overall risk assessment of the 
equipment. The scope of the present study is to verify trough a risk analysis the impacts that the issues 
related to deficit in ergonomic design may present for the overall availability and safety of the plant. 
Issues overlooked by both the technical standards and the designers. 
2. The need for risk informed design in GIS 
The term switchgear, used in association with the electric power system, or grid, refers to the 
combination of electrical disconnects, fuses and/or circuit breakers used to isolate electrical equipment. 
Switchgear is used both to de-energize equipment to allow work to be done and to clear faults 
downstream. This type of equipment is important because it is directly linked to the reliability of the 
electricity supply. A safe, reliable supply of electricity depends on the circuit breakers that protect our 
electricity grids in the event of short circuits. An effective although more costly form of switchgear is 
gas insulated switchgear (GIS), where the conductors and contacts are insulated by pressurized 
sulphur hexafluoride gas (SF6). The use of GIS rather than conventional air insulated switchgear (AIS) 
is enabling the new substation to be housed indoors and condensed into around one quarter of the 
space. Gas Insulated Switchgear have been gradually changed, moving towards layout that require 
less and less space and often means having less space and awkward stations for the technicians 
during commissioning and maintenance actions. 
Figure 1 shows an overall vision of the most important components of the GIS that are involved in the 
commissioning and maintenance phase. Figure 1 represents a section of the GIS system (not to scale). 
 
Figure.1 Cross Section View of GIS 
The designers and manufacturers often refer to GIS as maintenance free, however commissioning, 
operational checks and inspections and the occasional maintenance interventions are activities during 
which the technicians need to interface with the equipment and the issues regarding the interfaces 
provided have been analysed to identify their relevance in the overall GIS risk assessment. 
The study highlights clearly that good design, taking into account all potential risks, helps to ensure 
safety during repair and maintenance work. It demonstrates once again the importance of taking into 
account human factors at the design stage of a piece of equipment; where modifications are easier to 
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carry out and less expensive than they would be once the plant is built. The end users of the machine 
were actively involved throughout the whole risk assessment process and played a crucial role in 
ensuring an evaluation of the conditions leading to a safe commissioning and operations of GIS. 
This study was also used to evaluate whether current standards used for the design and operation of 
High voltage equipment (CEI IEC 62271-202, 2006) are sufficiently taking into account the relevant 
aspects of man-machine interface. 
To achieve the objective, a preliminary risk assessment has been performed on an installation 
complying with relevant standards (IEC 62271-202, 2006; IEC 62271-1, 2007; IEC 62271-203, 2004). 
3.  The use of an extended FMEA for taking into account Human Operations 
The Risk Assessment was performed using an ad hoc Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
template where the functional analysis included the human tasks as well as the technical aspects. 
The risk levels associated to each possible failure mode were obtained using the risk matrix proposed 
by a US Military standard used for FMEA analysis (MIL-STD-882, 1993). The overall method aimed at 
providing the assessment of a Risk Level similar to the Safety Integrity Level evaluation required by 
standards (EN IEC 61508, 2002) (originally developed for process plants, machineries and vehicles 
contain requirements and recommendations for validating safety-related electrical, electronic and 
programmable control systems). 
The method would start with a functional analysis of the equipment to identify all the relevant functions 
to be performed by the equipment or by an operator and the connected failure modes. Some of the 
failure modes can be determined assessing the Human Errors using the Technique for Human Error 
Rate Prediction (THERP) developed for the U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Swain and Guttman, 
1983). Information about the order of magnitude of the likelihoods of the events was obtained using 
equipment reliability data (when available) and THERP for relevant human errors. The severity of the 
outcomes was assigned using expert judgment based on the classifications guidelines proposed in the 
US military standard that provides guidelines for FMEA analysis (MIL-STD-882, 1993). 
The template used identifies the man-machine functions as a starting point for the functional analysis 
column. The phases of the analysis performed are: 
1. Functional analysis for man and machine actions at different stages of the plant lifecycle (the only 
one considered are commissioning, normal life, maintenance. Decommissioning and installation 
were not considered for the purpose of the analysis)  
2. Identification of the key tasks 
3. Identification the failure modes for the components and error modes for the operator tasks 
involved in the operation 
4. Detection of causes and consequences of the human error or failure of the device involved in the 
task  
Table.1: Hazard severity (category are compared with the one proposed by a standard used for safety 
of machinery (IEC 62061 2005) 
Category Name Characteristic 
I (4)* Catastrophic Death / Loss of system 
II (3) Critical Severe injury or morbidity/ Major damage to system 
III (2) Marginal Minor injury or morbidity/ Minor damage to system 
IV (1) Negligible No injury or morbidity (first aid)/ No damage to system 
 
Once the qualitative analysis was completed the next step was the evaluation of the appropriate 
reliability data to be used for the quantitative assessment. For the quantification of the hazards in terms 
of severity of consequences and likelihood of occurrence, we have adopted the same approach 
proposed in the standard commonly used for safety of machinery (IEC 62061, 2005) with the purpose 
to follow the guideline used in the field of safety of machinery for the establishment of a Safety Integrity 
Level. To apply the hazard assessment matrix (Table 3) to evaluate whether the risk was unacceptable 
or acceptable it was necessary to translate the numerical values, obtained from the quantitative 
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analysis, in a judgment (Tables 1 and 2). The choice of range in which likelihood and severity of 
consequences fall, are in line with the guidelines proposed by a US Military standard (MIL-STD-882 
1993). 
Table.2: Categories of Hazard likelihood where the category given by the Military standard is aligned 
with the one proposed by a standard used for safety of machinery (IEC 62061 2005) 
Category Name Characteristic Probability ref. [event/y] 
A (5)* Frequent Likely to occur frequently/ Occurred several times in the 
last 5 years in the company. > 10
-1 
B (4) Probable Will occur several times in life  
of a component. Has occurred in the company. 10
-1
 to 10-3 
C (3) Occasional Likely to occur sometimes in life of a component. 
Has occurred more than once in the industry. < 10
-3 
D (2) Remote Unlikely but possible to occur in life of a component. Has 
occurred in the industry. No damage to system < 10
-4 
E (1) Improbable Occurrence may not be experienced. 
Never occurred in the industry < 10
-6 
Table.3: Tools to define the class of risk: Hazard Assessment Matrix and Hazard Risk Index 
Frequency  
of occurrence 
Hazard severity 
I 
Catastrophic 
II 
Critical 
III 
Marginal 
IV 
Negligible 
A - Frequent RI 1 RI 1 RI 1 RI 3 
B - Probable RI 1 RI 1 RI 2 RI 3 
C - Occasional RI 1 RI 2 RI 2 RI 4 
D - Remote RI 2 RI 2 RI 3 RI 4 
E - Improbable RI 3 RI 3 RI 3 RI 4 
 
The quantitative analysis required to identify the likelihood and consequences related to a variety of 
events like failure mode of the electrical components, human error, “falls from ladders”, etc. and for this 
reason these values have been obtained from different sources. 
Failure rate of electrical device were provided by reliability data of the manufacturer or through 
GESCOM data base (CESI, 2005) related to reliability of the components of the Italian electricity grid. 
In this last case the value was not related to each single component but it refers to the whole system; 
from the MTTF (Mean Time To Failure) it was possible to obtain the respective failure rate using the 
following relation: . 
Likelihood of events like “falls from ladders” derives from expert judgment and from records of worker’s 
injury reported by the company involved in the analysis. 
3.1 The contribution of possible human errors and their influencing factors 
The failure rate values associated to human error were obtained through the application of THERP 
model (Swain and Gutman, 1983). THERP (Technique for Human error Rate Prediction) is a method to 
predict human error probabilities and to evaluate the degradation of a man-machine system likely to be 
caused by human errors alone or in connection with equipment functioning, operational procedures 
and practices, etc. 
THERP requires the analyst to determine whether the error to be examined is one of omission, one of 
commission, or diagnosis and sources of operator burden include the following: a) time constraints, b) 
diagnosis, c) physiological factors, etc. The data for human error probability (HEP) in THERP tables 
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referred to the assumption of a lognormal distribution for the human error probability density function 
(truncated in 0 and 1). In the tables two values are reported: the median of the distribution and error 
factor.  From this two values the mean value for the lognormal distribution is obtained to be used for 
assessing the final HEP. For those ergonomic constraints that could actually prevent the job from being 
effectively carried out it was assigned factor 10, for those constraints that could force the operator to 
err a multiplication of a factor 5 was used. The likelihood obtained was also discounted to take into 
account the actual timeframe over which certain tasks are carried out in the life period of the equipment 
(e.g. commissioning is 1/ 30 years, where 30 years is the expected life duration of the equipment, and 
Maintenance interventions 1/ 5 years) 
4. Main findings of the assessment 
The study shows that the most significant issues are:  
- often limited and restrictive working areas; 
- the technician has to work in fixed and awkward posture for sustained periods of time, 
- difficulty or complete inability of reading the metrological data, 
- slowdown in emergency procedure. 
Most of these issues are ergonomic aspects and they have an important relapse on reliability of the 
whole system and on the wellbeing of the operators. It seems that some basic principles of accessibility 
were not properly taken into account in the design of the equipment. The lack of basic ergonomics 
principle in design is reflected in the difficulties encountered by the operators to manually open or close 
the circuit breakers in case of failure of automatic activation. The risk is that the worker may fail to 
resolve possible critical situations in time because he/she must reach the high location and turn the 
mechanism shaft while standing in an awkward position. 
The results of the first step of the analysis are confirmed and supported by a survey of users of GIS 
carried out by the Committee of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE, 2010). 
The results provided by the quantitative analysis suggest two types of consequences. The first is 
related to the underestimation of the risk associated with the loss of primary functions of the plant 
normally achieved with a traditional FMEA, the failures connected to loss of efficiency, possible 
disruption to customers seems to be much higher and diverse than the one normally considered in 
common FMEA performed on that type of equipment (Buakaew, 2010). Once applied the hazard 
assessment matrix the hazard risk index for each failure mode falls into two different classes: Risk 
index 1 and Risk index 2. One is unacceptable (Risk index 1) the other risk index commonly obtained 
(Risk Index 2) refers to undesirable situations where the operation is possible but awkward to perform 
such that the operator may be more easily induced to make mistakes. In those cases the 
consequences are severe both for the operator safety and for the plant efficiency.  
Table 5 contains an extract of the results obtained for the risk Assessment of the GIS with some 
examples of the failure modes leading to a risk index 1 or 2. 
5. Conclusions 
The analysis results confirm that the accessibility of the GIS presents different crucial aspect that the 
basic standards for High voltage equipment (IEC 62271-1, 2007; IEC 62271-203, 2004 )and the 
manufacturer did not take into proper account.  
The technical regulation IEC related to GIS is not completely exhaustive for the aspects of detail 
affecting the management of GIS. It does not provide any clear approach to do the risk analysis. 
Taking into account human factors during the risk analysis the level of risk change significantly, in 
some cases up to an order of magnitude going from acceptable risk to undesirable or in the worst case 
to unacceptable. 
The results show that more exhaustive evaluation is necessary and that the interface between the 
operator and the equipment cannot be negligible.  
When the risk level falls in the class unacceptable or undesirable some countermeasure is required.  
To achieve useful results it could be necessary to apply some concept like “Safety Integrity Level”, 
which is currently only related to machinery but probably adaptable to high voltage equipment. 
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In the specific case of GIS some technical specifications exist (Terna, 2010) and gives some 
interesting guidelines that could be taken into account to improve the accessibility of the bays. 
The results were discussed in a review meeting with operational personnel and the safety supervisor of 
the company interested in this issue. They approved and confirmed the problems highlighted by the 
analysis and will use them to try and identify feasible solution with the management. 
Table.5: Table reporting an extract of the FMEA performed on the GIS 
id Man-Machine function Failure mode Causes Consequences L C R 
6 Visual inspections             
6.1 Take counter reading if 
cycles above 10.000 
perform minor 
maintenance 
Operating 
cycle counter 
does not 
work 
Operating 
linkage is loose 
or defective   
operating cycle 
counter is 
defective 
Incorrect 
maintenance 
B III 2 
Operator can 
not see the 
counter 
Awkward 
reachability 
Incorrect 
maintenance 
6.2.1 Inspect cabinet(free of 
damages), check heater 
functions, verify ventilation 
opening allow free air 
movement, examine view 
windows must be clear of 
dust and moisture 
Operator fail 
to make the 
checks 
The window to 
be checked and 
the ventilation 
opening are not 
easily 
reacheable 
Presence of 
moisture in the 
breaker can go 
undetected  
B II 1 
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